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China’s “New Type of Great Power Relations”: A G2 with Chinese Characteristics?    
 
Abstract  
The rise of China has been reshaping how China sees its own role in the world. China has 
become increasingly willing to move from being a norm and system taker to a norm and 
system shaper (if not yet maker). One example is Xi Jinping’s promotion of “a new type of 
great power relations” designed to create a strategic space in which to operate. By using 
content analysis, we analyze 141 Chinese articles titled with “new type of great power 
relations”. We find that although Chinese analysts and policy makers rejected the idea of G2 
in 2009, the mainstream discourse has rapidly shifted to what we call a “G2 with Chinese 
characteristics” which indicates a fundamental shift in Chinese evaluation of the power status 
of itself and others. While some Chinese scholars consider China to already have achieved 
the status as the world’s “No.2” or even a superpower, the mainstream discourse views China 
as both a great power AND a rising power at the same time. This, we argue, moderates the 
expectations of what China can and should do to resolve global problems despite its great 
power status.   
  
Introduction 
 
When the idea of a G2 was first floated in the wake of the global financial crisis, it was met 
with considerable suspicion – and occasionally outright opposition – in China. In essence, 
there was a feeling that China was being expected to do things on a global scale that a 
country of China’s level of development neither had the ability nor the responsibility to 
undertake. It was being “flattered” into prematurely taking on the provision of global public 
goods by being treated as a near competitor by the US. In response, sceptical Chinese 
analysts and officials argued that even though China had (at the time) the world’s second 
largest economy, “large” was not the same thing as “rich” (let alone powerful). In per capita 
terms China was still a relatively poor country with around 150 million people living in 
poverty, and thus should be expected to behave on the global scene accordingly as a 
developing and/or emerging power. 1 This was compounded by a suspicion that countries in 
the West were in some ways trying to put the blame for the financial crisis on global 
imbalances (and thus countries like China) rather than undertaking painful structural financial 
reform themselves. 2 Why should China have to take on increased burdens in solving global 
problems that were not of its making, instead of focusing its (more limited than appeared at 
first sight) resources on dealing with its own domestic development challenges?3  
Moreover, the idea of forming a special alliance with the pre-existing superpower sat 
uneasily with Chinese analyses of (and hopes for) the changing nature of the global order. A 
combination of the decline in US power, the rise (though not to be exaggerated) of new 
powers, and the spread of a type of globalisation that undermined the authority of states to 
                                                          
1 Liu, Liping (2011) “China can hardly Rule the World”, Contemporary International Relations, (1).  
2 Wei, Zonglei and Fu, Yu (2011) “China’s Search for an Innovative Foreign Strategy”, Contemporary 
International Relations, 21 (3) May/June 2011. 
3 Chen, Zhimin, "International Responsibility and China’s Foreign Policy," in China’s Shift: Global Strategy of 
the Rising Power, ed. Masafumi Iida (Tokyo: The National Institute for Defense Studies, 2009).:26 
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control economic activity meant that the world was entering a new era.4 As the then Premier 
Wen Jiabao put it in rejecting the G2 concept  
“some say that world affairs will be managed solely by China and the United States. I 
think that view is baseless and wrong…It is impossible for a couple of countries or a 
group of big powers to resolve all global issues. Multipolarization and multilateralism 
represent the larger trend and the will of people.” 5 
Scroll forward four years and a very different understanding of China’s global power status 
(and relationship with the US) was evident when Xi Jinping proposed to establish a “new 
type of great power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi) between the US and China during his 
trip to Washington in 2012. Xi Jinping subsequently reiterated the concept during high level 
meetings between the US and China. For example, during his meeting with Thomas Donilon, 
National Security Advisor to the U.S. President, Xi said that:  
“Both sides should, from the fundamental interest of the people of the two countries and of 
the world, join the efforts to build up China-U.S. cooperative partnership, trying to find a 
completely new way for the new type of great power relations, which would be 
unprecedented in history and open up the future” (emphasis added). 6 
This new relationship was partly intended to provide a basis for solving bilateral problems 
between China and the USA – but from a more symmetrical position than before. To be sure, 
in the majority of China’s eyes, the US remains the predominant global power, and will 
continue to do so for some time to come. But this is now a relationship between two Great 
Powers rather than between one Great Power and one developing economy. It was also partly 
a signal of an acceptance that China has a special role and duty as a great power to work with 
other Great Powers/the US to solve global problems. Here it is perhaps worth noting that Xi’s 
Washington visit took place prior to the 2012 G8 meeting – a meeting which in 2012 was 
hosted by the US, and to which China was not invited.7 So perhaps the timing of Xi’s 
overture to Obama had something to do with reminding Washington of the new realities of 
global power configurations and the utility (or lack of it) of trying to solve global problems 
without China’s active participation.  
Whilst not so apparent in 2012, as more time has passed, it has become clear that under 
Xi Jinping, China has abandoned its strategy of “keeping a low profile” and is instead 
proactively striving to establish “a favorable (global) environment for China’s national 
rejuvenation”.8 This is in part based on a re-assessment of what is often referred to in China 
as its comprehensive national strength relative to the strength of others, and the increasingly 
wide-spread belief that whilst China cannot challenge the US as the world’s predominant 
power just yet (or indeed, for some time to come), it has already attained “Great Power” 
                                                          
4 For a representative example see Cui, Liru, "quanqiuhua shidai yu duojihua shijie (the Globalisation Era and 
the Multipolar World)," xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) 30th Anniversary 
commemorative issue (2010). 
5Xinhua News, Chinese premier rejects allegation of China, U.S. monopolizing world affairs in future, available 
at http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-05/21/content_11409799.htm accessed on 27 June 2015 (2009) 
6 People’s Daily, Xi Jinping huijian meiguo zongtong guojia anquan shiwu zhuli duonilun (Xi Jinping met 
National Security Advisor to the U.S. President Thomas Donilon), see 
http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2013-05/28/nw.D110000renmrb_20130528_4-01.htm accessed on 15 
June 2015 (2013) 
7 Non G8 members are normally invited to the summit to discuss issues that they have a stake in, but in 2012, no 
additional country representatives were invited at all.  
8 Yan, Xuetong, "From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement," The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014). 
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status, and now has a strategic opportunity period in which to exercise this great power to 
serve Chinese interests. The strategic opportunity period was initially typically described as 
the first decade of the twenty first century. However, as we have moved into the second 
decade, some argue that the moment of opportunity is still there, but China must act quickly 
as the US is trying to create a new Washington-based global governance structure antithetical 
to Chinese interests – for example, through the creation of the Trans Pacific Partnership.9 
And whilst China is only one of a number of rising powers that are increasingly prepared to 
challenge the legitimacy of the existing global order, the increasingly dominant position sees 
China as at least first amongst equals, and in many cases, as the global Number Two.  
While the idea of China as Great Power is widely accepted within China, once you dig 
a little and try to discover what being a Great Power actually means (or put another way, 
what you need to be defined as a Great Power), then broad consensus is replaced by 
ambiguity and uncertainty. And it is exactly this lack of clarity that is the focus of this 
paper.10 By analysing 141 Chinese language articles, we open domestic “insider” debates - 
over the nature of China’s international identity, the nature of Chinese power, and the nature 
of the global order – to a wider non-Chinese-speaking community. As already noted, while 
some Chinese scholars even consider China to already have achieved the status as the world’s 
“No.2” or even a superpower, the mainstream discourse views China as both a Great Power 
and rising power at the same time. And it is this double identity (or perhaps identity 
confusion) that makes it hard to pin down what exactly is at the heart of a great power 
relationship (be it a new one or not). As the boundary between great power and non-great 
power is unclear, this conceptual vagueness has made China’s strategic intentions more 
difficult to predict.  
There is also some disagreement over whether only the US qualifies as the Great Power 
that China needs to establish a new type of relationship with, or whether it applies to other 
countries as well (and if so, which ones). But only some disagreement – the vast majority of 
Chinese scholars build their analysis solely around Sino-US relations. As such, we might 
suggest that the mainstream discourse of this concept is moving towards what we might call a 
“G2 with Chinese characteristics”. This is a G2 relationship defined by and for 
China/Chinese interests on Chinese terms, rather than one established by outsiders to 
primarily serve the interests of others. In this respect, China can be seen as increasingly 
playing the role of a norm contester and perhaps even a norm shaper, rather than just a norm 
taker.  
 
 
Contextualising the Study: Methods, Theories and Strategic 
 
This paper forms part of a broader study that has its roots in trying to understand how China’s 
changing global role is understood within China itself, and how these debates translate into 
calls for a change in Chinese policy positions. It is important to say at the outset that this is a 
diverse debate with numerous different voices and opinions. Of course the nature of the 
Chinese politics places certain constraints on what can be discussed; it is not easy, for 
example, to find calls for Taiwanese independence. But as long as China’s core interests are 
                                                          
9 See, for example, Xu, Jian, “Rethinking China’s Period of Strategic Opportunity”, China International Studies 
March/April 2014 51-70. 
10 We do not explore the origination and evolution of the new type of great power relations concept here – this 
was the focus of a separate study, please see Jinghan Zeng, Constructing a New Type of Great Power Relations: 
the State of Debate in China, British Journal of Politics and International Relations, forthcoming 
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respected,11 then there is considerable room for a spread of different views to be articulated 
about what China’s place in the world is today, could be/should be in the future, and the best 
way of achieving a broadly agreed on need for further national rejuvenation. 
Nevertheless, there are some broad areas of consensus that provide a background 
context to the specific debate around China’s great power status and the new type of great 
power relations.12 The first is the belief that there really has been a significant shift in the 
distribution of power in the global order (particularly after the global financial crisis), and 
China has been one of the major recipients of this power shift. Importantly, this does not 
mean that China is on the verge of replacing the US as the world’s dominant power any time 
soon, and that any changes China wants to push for will have to take place from within the 
existing structure of US predominance, which places considerable constraints on what China 
can achieve and how it can operate. A second emerging consensus is that China (or perhaps 
more correctly, China’s leaders) were not prepared this rapid rise and relative change in 
power capabilities and are now struggling to learn how best to evaluate, exercise and use its 
newly found power in ways that lead to real influence and change. Or as Vice Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Fu Ying put it, China “needs time” to “grow into the role as a world 
citizen”.13  
The third broad consensus is built around a recognition that the current international 
order has served China rather well since the end of the Cold War, and provided an 
international environment that has facilitated China’s growth and re-emergence as a global 
power. To be sure, there are concerns about the distribution of power in the current 
institutions of global governance and some of the norms that underpin them. This is related to 
the belief that China’s voice is not given as much weight as it should be in global politics, 
and a general but difficult to quantify feeling that China isn’t given enough respect by others. 
What this means is that China is pushing a reform agenda rather than seeking to replace the 
current global order with a new sinocentric – and reform has to be achieved in ways that don't 
fracture the existing system and in the process harm China’s own self interests. And for many 
Chinese analysts, this already complicated endeavour will be made more difficult by a 
perceived US turn away from multilateralism to putative governance institutions like the 
Trans Pacific Partnership that would once more place China as an outsider as new rules of 
economic governance are developed. 
While China may not have what Vice Premier Wang Yang calls “the ability nor the 
intent to challenge the United States” and overthrow the existing global order,14 the fourth 
consensus is that there is now a greater appetite to both assert China’s interests and objectives, 
and to take action to redress perceived inequities and governance gaps by increasing China’s 
                                                          
11 Jinghan Zeng, Yuefan Xiao, and Shaun Breslin, "Securing China’s Core Interests: The State of Debate in 
China," International Affairs 91, no. 2 (2015). 
12 The following four paragraphs are informed by discussions with Jia Qingguo, Ren Xiao and Zhao Minghao in 
November 2015 and we are grateful for their agreement to include them here.   
13 Fu Ying (2015) “Under the same roof: China’s View of World Order”, The Huffington Post, 11 November, 
available at http://www.huffingtonpost.com/fu-ying/china-global-order_b_8537918.html?utm_hp_ref=world 
accessed 16 November 2015. 
14 Wang, Yang, Comments made at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and World Business, December 2014, 
available at http://www.thechicagocouncil.org/event/us-china-shared-vision-global-economic-partnership, 
accessed 14th January 2015 
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“institutional voice” (zhiduxing huayuquan).15 This has in part taken the form of providing 
new forms of governance through, for example, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, 
and the BRICS New Development Bank. While it is too soon to know yet exactly how The 
Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Road initiatives will pan out, 
they are widely seen within China as manifestations of a new proactive China seeking to 
establish itself as a major global actor.  
This proactivity is also seen in the establishment of a wide range of different types of 
relationships with other states depending on the partners’ levels of development and/or 
alignment with China on major policy issue areas. The aim is to establish a network of global 
hub-and-spoke partnerships with China at the centre. Here we can point to the example of a 
partnership based on a shared dissatisfaction with reform of global governance with the rest 
of the BRICs. At the same time China has developed a more paternalistic (shared) 
development partnership with African states as epitomised by the Forum on China Africa 
Cooperation. And in China’s own neighbourhood, it has built a separate partnership built on 
shared trade and financial futures with Southeast Asian states (and ASEAN as an 
organisation), and another set of relationships with neighbours to the north and northwest 
through the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. It also entails building different sorts of 
relationships with (other) great powers - and this, of course is where the new type of great 
power relations comes back to the centre of attention.  
 
Methods 
In order to study the Chinese discourse of new type of great power relations, we used the 
term “new type of great power relations” (xinxing daguo guanxi or xinxing de daguo guanxi) 
to search Chinese academic articles from China’s largest journal database, China National 
Knowledge Infrastructure. This helped us to identify 141 articles with the term in the title. 
We then developed a code manual in order to best undertake content analyses of these articles. 
We divided our data analysis into two: “new type of relations” and “great power”. This article 
will focus on the “great power” dimension – it builds on a previous paper that has considered 
the “new type of relations”. 16  In order to validate and contextualise our findings, we 
conducted two sets of interviews with representative academics in Beijing in April and June 
2015, with final adjustments made after further discussions with Chinese academics at the 
Beijing Forum in November 2015. All data including our coding manual, codebook, online-
appendix and other replication materials are available online from our research page.17    
This methodological approach allows us to cover a wide range of material, which 
contrasts with studies that instead choose to focus on the arguments of a small selected 
                                                          
15 For details on the evolution of the concept of institutional voice, see the discussion on “expanding China’s 
role in global governance” on the China Policy website, available at http://us2.campaign-
archive2.com/?u=3fd756a9629015f7becc6e127&id=822399aaaa&e=a045660cf1, accessed 18 November 2015.  
16 Jinghan Zeng, Constructing a New Type of Great Power Relations: the State of Debate in China, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, forthcoming 
17 Please see https://sites.google.com/site/zengjinghan/data  
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number of key participants in the debate.18  Its main advantage over this more selective 
method is to provide a comprehensive overview of the breadth of the debate in general and 
take the temperature of the national debate as a whole, including the voices of those not often 
heard in analyses of Chinese debates. What it doesn't allow for very easily is to consider 
which voices are more authoritative and influential – both in the debate itself and in 
translating the academic debates into actual policy. In terms of the quantitative analysis in the 
paper, this approach is rather “democratic” as it treats all publications equally irrespective of 
the weight and importance of either the journal or the author. To adjust for this, our analysis 
is supported by examples of representative positions and understandings, which draw 
wherever possible from those writings identified as the most significant by colleagues in 
China.  
China’s call for new type of great power relations has an important theoretical context; 
or more correctly, two theoretical contexts. The first is ours as observers and analysts of 
Chinese debates, and shifting Chinese policy. The second is the theoretical context of the 
debates within China itself. And it is important in a paper like this to point out that the two 
are not the same. For example, many analysts have argued that realism remains the dominant 
theoretical approach used in Chinese international relations academia. But identifying a 
realist predilection does not mean that those analysts are themselves starting from the same 
realist position; indeed, as they are trying to identify different domestic discourses, it is rather 
likely that they start from alternative competing positions. In our case, as we are interested in 
the way that different identities co-exist, how they emerge evolve and change, and how these 
identities influence the policy arena, then it goes without saying that we do not think that 
national interests are systemically or otherwise simply “given”. While this specific study only 
concerns itself with the manifestation of identity politics in the specific form of great power 
relations, it is built on a wider interest in the way that these identities are formed in the first 
place. Moreover, we argue that many of the core terms that are associated with international 
politics and great power relations lack intersubjective meaning – including the term great 
power itself. We thus need to parse what these terms mean to different people in different 
settings to ensure that we do not simply impose our meaning and understanding on what 
others are saying. We are not suggesting that the way that academics and policy analysts 
debate key concepts is the only determinant of Chinese foreign policy – far from it. But we 
do suggest that these debates shed some light onto how China might act in the future.  
Although this is primarily a study of academic discourses, there is a close connection 
between academic research and policy analysis in China, and these debates have important 
policy implications. The policy community is well represented in our selection of papers with 
24.1% articles written by scholars at Chinese state-affiliated think tanks, and 4% written by 
senior officials. This latter group includes a number of high profile officials including Wang 
Yi, the minister of foreign affairs, Cui Tiankai, the Chinese ambassador to the US, Yu 
Hongjun, the vice minister of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) International 
Department, He Yafei, the Deputy director of the Overseas Chinese Affairs Office of the 
State Council (and the former vice-minister of foreign affairs), and Ma Zhengang, the former 
Chinese ambassador to the UK. Moreover, making policy suggestions is a key objective of 
Chinese academic writings on politics – perhaps even the principal purpose. It is not 
uncommon for China’s leaders to introduce new policy initiatives (or concepts) in a top down 
manner without the concept being fully fleshed out or understood. Once announced, scholarly 
                                                          
18 Qi Hao, China Debates the New Type of Great Power Relations, The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics, (2015). Qi Hao’s paper also provides an interesting counterpart to this one by focussing on the ways 
that a new relationship might be realised and the challenges and obstacles that lie in the way.  
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debate (noting the blurred lines between academic and policy-based research) gradually and 
incrementally fills the concept with substance and meaning in a subsequent and incremental 
manner. The need to do so is sometimes made more urgent by outsiders’ attempts to impose 
their (rather than Chinese) meanings on the concept, as they try to interpret Chinese 
objectives and intentions in ways that serve others’ interests, rather than China’s. Thus, to 
become a system shaper, it is important for Chinese thinkers to develop China’s discursive 
power and ability to define and operationalise core concepts themselves to lay a foundation 
for articulating Chinese interests and objectives to others.  
Which brings us to the theoretical context of the studies within China themselves. 
There remains some suspicion in China that there is an attempt by some in the west to 
deliberately misinterpret Chinese intentions. But even when there is no nefarious deliberate 
attempt to misrepresent China’s future, such a misrepresentation can still emerge, so the 
argument goes, through the use of theories and historical precedents that are simply not 
appropriate for studying China’s rise today. Western theories are just that – Western; they are 
built on the study of Western (and mostly European) experiences in a very different historical 
epoch. For those who hold this view, chief amongst these misguided theoretical starting 
points are power transition understandings built on neorealist assumptions. Here there is a 
particular focus on the work of John Mearsheimer, who argues that history has shown us that 
a rising power and the existing hegemon are unlikely to come to peaceful accommodation. 
The most obvious result of contemporary power shifts is US-China security competition in 
East Asia, with a great potential for war.19  
Whilst this might sound like a wholly academic endeavour, Chinese leaders have also 
noted the pessimistic prediction of this theory, and called for a Chinese response. In the 
words of Xi Jinping,20 “we all to need to work together to avoid the so-called Thucydides trap 
-- destructive tensions between an emerging power and established powers.” And the 
initiative of promoting the idea of new type of great power relations is part of the solution to 
avoiding this Thucydides trap. As the rest of this paper will make clear, while China has not 
yet explicitly elaborated what new type of great power relations is, China does make it very 
clear on what it is not; it is not the old type of great power relations as envisaged by power 
transition theory, that involves power struggles, conflict, and a zero-sum game.   
 While the starting point of this Chinese-coined concept might be to disprove power 
transition theory, we suggest that its implications do not necessarily lead to the optimistic and 
peaceful future that its originators seem to envisage. As we elaborate below, this concept is 
underpinned by a shifting Chinese identity – an identity that considers China as deserving of 
a greater voice and greater respect in global politics. It reflects China’s rising expectations on 
not just its own role in the world, but also how others should respond to and treat China as a 
great power. However, the extent to which others – and particularly, of course, the US - will 
accept this position and the Chinese version of G2 remains open for debate. Simply stating 
that things will be different doesn't necessarily mean that they will be. The key is how others 
respond, and how they change their own positions (and identities) as China changes its.  
 
The Strategic Importance of Defining “Great Power” 
                                                          
19 John Mearsheimer, "Can China Rise Peacefully? ," The National Interest available at 
http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/can-china-rise-peacefully-10204, accessed on January 14, 2015 (2014). 
20 Xi, Jinping, "A Conversation with President Xi at Big's "Understanding China" Conference," (2014). 
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Given that relations with other great power are often described as “the core” of Chinese 
diplomacy,21 understanding the concept of “great power” is the key to deconstructing the real 
meaning of the “new type of great power relations”. Of course the concept of Great Powers is 
not new, and has a long academic tradition spanning back to the early nineteenth century and 
analyses of the changing balance of power in Europe. These historical precedents, and the 
idea that European experiences are the “cradle” of the study of Great Powers are reflected in 
the Chinese literature; but only in a limited fashion. The focus here is typically on the 
Napoleonic Wars as an example of what can happen when a dissatisfied rising great power 
confronts the established status quo one. However, it is notable that only five of the articles 
considered these European precedents, and only four discuss more recent non-Chinese 
theoretical debates by addressing the work of Kenneth Waltz.  
So while it may well be the case that current Chinese thinking is informed by previous 
historical experiences and theories, it generally does not specifically engage with them in the 
literature, which instead tends to focus on the specifics of China’s current circumstances. The 
primary context here is the attempt to establish a discourse that is accepted and shared outside 
China. The promotion of the idea of China as “great power” as predominantly used by 
Chinese scholars, implies that China expect the world – and the world is sometimes just a 
shorthand reference to the US – to recognize China’s status as a great power and treat it as 
such. For Shi Yinhong, if successful, this would establish a “strategic space” where China 
can pursue its interests and objectives in a way that is not possible for “normal” (non-Great 
Power) states.22 But this desire to be seen as a great power is somewhat tempered by a desire 
not to be expected to take on the burdens associated with global predominance and/or 
leadership. Hence the need to balance the new understanding of China’s new global status – 
great but still developing and rising.   
There is also a domestic context. This Chinese discourse of great power is strongly related 
to the (changing) nature of one party rule. Over the past three decades, the CCP has been 
promoting itself as the only vehicle that can deliver China’s national rejuvenation as one part 
of its strategy to maintain regime legitimacy. 23  In this discourse, it is only under CCP 
leadership that China has gradually won back the great power status that it enjoyed before a 
hostile and rapacious West (combined with corrupt and ineffective pre-CCP leaders) took 
China into a “century of humiliation”. The brilliant leadership of the party has won hard 
fought gains, and only the party can maintain China’s new found great power status in the 
face of hostile Western forces.  
 
But once more we see the need to balance, and the need to temper some of the 
expectations of what China as a great power can and/or should do. The promotion of the CCP 
as a means to attain national(ist) ends  has helped the party win popular support in the short 
term. The danger is that the popular acceptance of China as a great power (or world power, 
No.2) might generate high, unrealistic and/or expensive expectations of what China could and 
should be doing in international affairs. If Chinese diplomacy fails to meet rising expectations, 
then the leadership and the regime might appear to be ineffective. Thus, China’s international 
identity needs find a balance between promoting the idea of China as a great power on the 
                                                          
21 Zhao, Kejing and Yin, Xiting, "meiguo zhanlve tiaozheng yu zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi (American 
Strategic Adjustment and Sino-Us New Type of Great Power Relations)," guoji guanxi xueyuan xuebao 
(Journal of University of International Relations), no. 6 (2012).:81 
22 Shi, Yinhong, "Goujian xinxing daguo guanxi de hongguan de sikao (Macro Thinking of Establishing New 
Type of Great Power Relations)," qianxian (Front)  (2014). 
23 Jinghan Zeng, The Chinese Communist Party's Capacity to Rule: Ideology, Legitimacy and Party Cohesion 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2015). 
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one hand, and power capabilities and global leadership commitments (international 
diplomatic reality) on the other hand. Once more, we see an incentive to moderate the “great 
power” discourse by combining it with “rising power” capabilities and expectations.   
 
The identity of China in world politics 
If China needs to establish a new type of great power relations, then it stands to reason that 
China must already be a Great Power. But while the idea that China is a Great Power might 
be taken as given, what this actually means remains contested and debated.24 Some argue that 
“great power” simply equates with a strong power, which can be measured by such factors as 
population size, range of territory, economic scale, technological potential and military power. 
Others argue that it should not be decided by those factors but instead on a less easily 
quantifiable capacity to make and implement international rules,25 or global political and 
economic influence more broadly.26 However, the dominant position is not to define the term 
at all, with very few articles actually providing a clear definition. When it comes to 
considering China as a great power, this lack of definition is not so important (as long as 
everybody accepts that it is). But it is important when we switch the focus to identifying other 
(potential) great powers for China to have a relationship with. For example, according to Pan 
Wei, a prominent pro-left scholar, a great power is a country with “exceptional strength”.27 A 
consequent question is which countries could be considered as having “exceptional strength”? 
As we will discussed later, this remains somewhat open to question.  
In addition to “great power”, the academic discourse of new type of great power relations 
also includes other identities of China. Figure 1 shows the frequency of different conceptions 
of China’s international identity in the debate. The second most frequently mentioned identity 
is “rising power” (jueqiguo) and/or “emerging power” (xinxing daguo). Fully 87% of articles 
consider China to be a rising power. This is quite understandable given that the concept is 
primarily proposed to manage the potential conflicts with the existing hegemonic power – 
China might be a great power but not one that is a peer competitor of the United States which 
will remain the world’s predominant power for some time to come. Accordingly, the global 
responsibilities that fall on China and the USA should reflect this asymmetry in great power 
statuses. Furthermore, this identity of China as a rising power can be further sub-divided into 
two: a unique rising power and a universal rising power. The former suggests that China is 
THE rising contemporary great power (or clearly the most important one). The latter suggests 
that China is one of a group of emerging powers as manifest, for example, in the BRICS. As 
we shall see in more detail below, this has important consequences for thinking about how 
China should act, and with what partners, to achieve its aims. 
                                                          
24 Niu, Haibin and Song, Qing, ""goujian xinxing daguo guanxi" xuesu yantaohui zongshu (Conference Review 
Of "Establishing New Type of Great Power Relations")," Guoji zhanwang (International Review) 4 (2013); 
Zheng, Xuefei, "'xinxing daguo guanxi goujian yu guoji zhixu zhuanxing' yantaohui zongshu (Conference 
Review of Establishing New Type of Great Power Relations and Transition of International Order)," Xiandai 
guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) 11 (2013). 
25 Zheng, "'xinxing daguo guanxi goujian yu guoji zhixu zhuanxing' yantaohui zongshu (Conference Review of 
Establishing New Type of Great Power Relations and Transition of International Order)." 
26 Zhao, Gancheng, "Zhongyin guanxi: xinxing daguo guanxi de qianzhi yu yansheng (China and India: A 
Corollary to New Great Power Relations)," Nanya yanjiu (South Asia Studies) 2 (2014).:52 
27 Pan, Wei, "Zhengzai jueqi de 'xinxing daguo guanxi'" (the on-Going Rise of New Type of Great Power 
Relations)," Xuesu qianyan (Frontiers) 6 (2013).:28 
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We also find an article that critically evaluates China’s position as “emerging power”. It is 
argued that from the perspective of history, the US is still a “young emerging power” and far 
away from senescence.28 On the contrary, China is more like a “traditional power” instead of 
“emerging power” because China has just been gradually reviving to its rightful great power 
status in the history.29 This discourse goes back to the Chinese narrative of history that China 
had always been a leading power before the humiliations of the 19th century, and is now 
reassuming its (rightful) place in the global order. From this point of view, the revival of 
China is much more appropriate than the rise of China. 
 “World power” (shijie daguo) is the third most mentioned identity (11.34%). To many 
Chinese scholars, China has always been a world power – a key actor in world affairs. 
However, some also argue that the goal of China’s rise is to become a world power, 
suggesting that it has not become one yet.30 This confusion might simply be explained by the 
fact that the concept of World Power isn’t actually defined in any of the writings, and means 
different things to different people.  
China as No.2 (lao er) is the fourth most frequently mentioned identity (9.21%).31 In the 
Chinese academic discourse, it is widely argued that China is the second most powerful 
country and the new type of great power relationship is introduced to manage the potential 
conflicts between No. 1 (the US) and No.2 (China). In the relevant discourse, China is 
considered as No.2 not only in terms of economic size but also “comprehensive national 
strength”. This identity partly matches the identity of “rising power” that China could be both 
No.2 and a rising power; however, it also explicitly suggests that China is a unique rising 
power instead of a “normal” rising power within the group of BRICS.  
The most controversial identity is perhaps China as “superpower”. In the Chinese 
literature, superpower usually refers to the US and the Soviet Union. In the debate on new 
type of great power relations, a few (1.42%) consider China as a superpower.32 For example, 
Jia Qingguo, the dean of school of international studies at Peking University, argues that  
“China is a normal great power as well as a superpower….. it has the interests of a normal 
power and that of a superpower. As these two identities and interests are often 
contradictory or conflicting, it has been increasingly difficult for China to identify its 
interests and maintain the stability and continuity of its foreign policy.”33  
                                                          
28 Xu, Jian, "Goujian zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi de lishi tiaojian yu zhuyao wenti (Historical Conditions 
and Major Problems of Establishing Sino-Us New Type of Great Power Relations)," Guoji wenti yanjiu 
(International Studies) 2 (2013).:19 
29 Ibid.:19 
30 Yang, Yongfeng, "Daxiyang xianzhang zaixian yingmei lunzhan—pingshu lishi dui zhongmei goujian 
xinxing daguo guanxi de qishi (the Reflection of Dispute between Great Britain and the U.S .In the Atlantic 
Charter---Enlightenment on Building the New Sino-Us Relationship in the Asia-Pacific Region)," Taipingyang 
xuebao (Pacific Journal) 6 (2014).:69 
31 Notably, in the debate, Chinese scholars use the word “lao er” rather than “shijie di er(the second most 
powerful)” here. Lao er literally means the second child in the family, but the translation of lao er as no. 2 seems 
to be more appropriate here.  
32 E.g.Wu, Xinbo, "Goujian zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi de lujing xuanze (Path Selection in Constructing 
Sino-Us New Type of Great Power Relationship)," Zhongguo pudong ganbu xueyuan xuebao (Journal of China 
Executive Leadership Academy Pudong) 8, no. 2 (2014).:38 
33 Jia, Qingguo, "Bingchi zhizheng zhaoxi jingshen: jiji goujian zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi (Uphold The 
"Seize the Day" Spirit: Actively Construct Sino-Us New Type of Great Power Relations)," Guoji zhengzhi 
yanjiu (International Politics Study) 1 (2014). 
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The view that China as a superpower is no doubt a minority opinion, with the dominant view 
that only the US can be viewed as a contemporary superpower,.  
Notably, in the Chinese academic discourse, the above identities are quite vague to some 
extent. China as No. 2 and superpower are perhaps the least vague identities. In addition, 
Chinese scholars often add adjectives (e.g. developing) before key terms to qualify them; for 
example, developing great power and developing world power. Sometimes, those adjectives 
will change the meaning of the term. For example, Zhao Gancheng considers India as “a 
developing great power and emerging power” but not a real “great power”.34 Yu Lei and 
Shamsul Khan consider China as “emerging superpower” but not yet a real “superpower”.35 
Those adjectives make the use of those identities more complex and vague.  
This vagueness and the diverse understanding of those power identities have also led to 
disagreement over which countries are great power, as we will discuss below. Here, the key is 
to reiterate that with some exceptions, and in different ways, the identification of China as a 
great power is modified, qualified and perhaps moderated by insisting that China is still on an 
upward trajectory; and by implication, not yet at the point where it should be expected to take 
on all the obligations and responsibilities of a fully-fledged global superpower.  
 
Figure 1: Frequency of China’s international identity in the Chinese discourse of new 
type of great power relations (1998-2014) 
 
 
Great Powers in the Eye of China  
                                                          
34 Zhao, "Zhongyin guanxi: xinxing daguo guanxi de qianzhi yu yansheng (China and India: A Corollary to New 
Great Power Relations)." 
35 Yu, Lei and Khan, Shamsul "Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi: quaniu tixi yu liliang zhuanhuan lilun de tanjiu 
(China-Us New Type of Great Power Relationship: Theoretical Analysis of Global Systemic Transformation 
and Power Shift)," Zhanlve juece yanjiu (Journal of Strategy and Decision-Making) 6 (2014). 
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Great powers in Chinese discourses traditionally referred to two types of states: superpowers 
and historical major countries such as German and the UK.36 More recently, a third category 
has been added with the rise of emerging powers as well. So from this increasingly broad set 
of countries, which are now qualified as contemporary great powers in China’s “new type of 
great power relations” framework? Figure 2 provides the answer. It shows the frequency of 
countries that are referred as great powers in the Chinese literature. The most frequently 
mentioned great powers are the US (93.6%), Russia (15.6%), India (10.6%), and Japan 
(9.2%).   
 
A G2 with Chinese Characteristics? 
At the risk of oversimplification, we can identify two broad strands of argument here.37 
The first, and most dominant strand is where the only relationship that is specifically referred 
to in discussions of great power relations is the one between China and the US (72.3% of 
articles). In this strand, it is widely believed that China entered a new historical epoch at 
some point during the global financial crisis. From the end of the Cold War, the Sino-US 
relationship was characterised as a relationship between the unipolar superpower (the US) 
and a normal power (China). Now, China has risen out of the ranks of other normal powers in 
the previous multi-power international system (for example, Japan and Russia)38 to take a 
special role of No.2 in the world.39 Some even argue that the US should accept China as an 
equal status great power.40 But whether No.2 or joint first, the underlying message is the 
same; the new type of great power relationship is only about relations with the US,41 and 
cannot be generalized to study China’s relations with other major countries.42 
                                                          
36 Zhao, Bole, "Zhongyin guanxi - xinxing de daguo guanxi (Sino-India Relations: New Type of Great Power 
Relations)," Dangdai yatai (Contemporary Asia-pacific Studies) 8 (2005). Sometimes it also includes Russia as 
the heir apparent of the Soviet Union but it is also considered as an emerging power. The Russian identity is 
overlapped in this discourse. 
37 This is not to say, there are only two views. Indeed, there are a great mount of diversity and vagueness in the 
Chinese academic discourse. We only use this simplified division to introduce our findings although there are 
slightly overlaps as we will explain later. 
38 Yuan, Peng, "Guanyu goujian zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi de zhanlve sikao (Strategic Thoughts on 
Establishing Sino-Us New Type of Great Power Relations)," Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International 
Relations) 5 (2012).:6 
39 e.g.Yang, Luhui, "Zhongguo jueqi beijing xia de zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi (a New Type of Major 
Power Relationship between China and the Us in the Context of China's Rise: From the Perspective of 
International Security Public Goods Supply)," Shandong daxue xuebao (Journal of Shandong University) 6 
(2013).:4; Dong, Chunling, "Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi: xin zai hechu? (Sino-China New Type of Great 
Power Relationship: What Is New?)," Shijie zhishi (World Affairs) 8 (2013); Yuan, "Guanyu goujian zhongmei 
xinxing daguo guanxi de zhanlve sikao (Strategic Thoughts on Establishing Sino-Us New Type of Great Power 
Relations).":6 
40 Xue, Litai Xue and Feng, Zheng, "Lishi guaiquan de dapo weishenme shi zai jintian? zhongmei goujian 
xinxing daguo guanxi de bage furenzhili" (Why Did the Historical Cycle Break Today? Eight Convincing 
Reasons of New Type of Great Power Relationship between the Us and China)," Xueshu qiantan (Frontiers) 6 
(2013).:47 
41 Wang, Jisi, "Zhongmei dui xinxing daguo guanxi de renzhi chayi ji zhongguo duimei zhengce (Cognitive 
Differences between the Us and China and China's American Policy)," Dangdai shijie (Contemporary World) 
10 (2014). 
42 Niu and Song, "'Goujian xinxing daguo guanxi' xuesu yantaohui zongshu (Conference Review Of 
"Establishing New Type of Great Power Relations").":135; Zheng, ""Xinxing daguo guanxi goujian yu guoji 
zhixu zhuanxing" yantaohui zongshu (Conference Review of Establishing New Type of Great Power Relations 
and Transition of International Order)." 
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This strand of thinking results in a conception of China’s place in the global order that has 
much in common with the previous G2 idea. And indeed some writers are explicit in arguing 
that the new type of great power relations is a modification of the G2 concept.43 But crucially, 
it is a modification on China’s terms taking China’s world view and interests into account 
rather than just accepting the American G2 concept (built on American world views and 
interests). If it implies a G2, it is a “sinicised G2”. 
There are differences of opinion over how best to build this new type of Sino-US 
relationship. For some, the key is to establish the vision first, and then gradually fill it with 
substance.44 Others argue that because of insufficient strategic mutual trust and structural 
contradictions between the two, to establish this relationship needs to manage the interaction 
between US and China and then gradually form effective management mechanism. Wang Jisi 
and Wu Shengqi argue that these two different approaches are reflected in the two different 
strategies that each country deploys: China emphasizes the principles of this concept, while 
the US insists on its function i.e. how to use it to solve specific concerned problems.45 
It is also argued that the US should adapt the rise of China. The US should face the 
reality that the US and China as two world great power stand side by side in the Asia-
pacific.46 Some also argue that China is a world great power rather than the so-called “East 
Asia great power” in the American discourse and thus Sino-US relations should not be 
limited in Asia-pacific regions.47 Su Changhe argues that China’s peaceful rise has proven 
American allies system obsolete, and thus “it is time for the US to change itself and adapt to 
the world”.48 However, there is also a recognition that China needs to change too and that the 
establishment of new type of great power relations needs a process of “re-normalization”. In 
this “re-normalization”, China should avoid being too overconfident and impatient, and the 
US should not be too anxious and overly sensitive when facing its declining power and 
influence.49 
 
Great Powers Beyond the US 
By contrast, the second strand of writing and thinking, while acknowledging the significance 
of Sino-US relations, focuses on a broader range and set of relationships with other great 
                                                          
43 Zhang, Jiadong and Jing, Xin, "Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi: lishi, lilun yu xianshi (New Type of Great 
Power Relationship between the US and China: History, Theory and the Reality)," Guoji guancha (International 
Review) 5 (2013).:25 
44 Zhang, Jian, "Shilun zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi de goujian (Discuss the Establishment of Sino-Us New 
Type of Great Power Relationship)," Guoji guanxi yanjiu (International Relations Studies) 3 (2013). 
45 Wang, Jisi and Wu, Shengqi, "Zhongmei dui xinxing daguo guanxi de renzhi chayi ji zhongguo dui mei 
zhengce (Cognitive Differences between the Us and China and China's American Policy)," Dangdai shijie 
(Contemporary World) 10 (2014). 
46 Xiao, An, "Shiguan zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi qianjing de liuge jiaodianxing wenti(Six Focal Issues 
Of sino-Us New Type of Great Power Relations Prospect)," Shijie zhishi (World Affairs) 12 (2013).:27 
47 Niu and Song, ""Goujian xinxing daguo guanxi" xueshu yantaohui zongshu (Conference Review Of 
"Establishing New Type of Great Power Relations").":137 
48 Su, Changhe, "Gongshengxing guoji tixi de keneng - zai yige duoji shijie zhong ruhe goujian xinxing daguo 
guanxi (the Possibility of Gongsheng International System: How to Build a New Type of Big Countries 
Relations in a Multi-Polar World)," Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics) 9 (2013).:18 
49 Li, Yonghui, ""Zai zhengchanghua"：zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi jianshezhong de guanli wenti ("Re-
Normalization": The Management Problems of Establishing Sino-Us New Type of Great Power Relations)," 
Xiandai guoji guanxi (Contemporary International Relations) 4 (2013). 
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powers.50 This is partly because the world is too complex and diverse to be ruled by just two 
countries, and Sino-US cooperation alone is simply not able to “achieve world peace, 
stability, and prosperity”.51 It is also argued that the rise of China is not an isolated but a 
group phenomenon, and thus China is only one of a number of rising powers that is 
challenging US supremacy.52 In this sense, the identity of great power is quite diverse.53 
Furthermore, there is more to the world than just the US, so it is important to build new types 
of relationships with a range of other great powers (and not just the US).54 
Within this broad strand of writing there remains considerable disagreement over the 
definition of great power. We roughly divide them into three groups, although we recognise 
some overlaps between views of the first and second groups.55 The first group tend to focus 
on the US and traditional major countries. It includes Russia (15.6%), Japan (9.2%), Canada, 
German, the UK, France and the EU more broadly.56  
The second group focuses on the US and emerging powers - especially the BRIC/BRICS, 
with Russia and India the most frequently identified rising great powers (so Russia is 
considered varyingly as both a rising power and a traditional “risen” one). The rise of China 
is not an isolated case, but representative of a broader shift in the global balance of power 
towards emerging powers.57 The Sino-US relationship is thus best seen as just one example 
of how to establish a workable relationship between a rising and an existing interests, rather 
than one that can dominate the international order on its own. 58  For example, Zhang 
Xiaoming argues that the primary content of new type of great power relations is the 
relationship between non-Western and Western great powers.59 Thus, the advocacy of new 
type of great power relations is not only the strategic demand of China, but all emerging 
powers. China is a representative of emerging power and an important participant of BRICS; 
however, it is not their “leader”.60  It has been suggested (in interviews in Beijing) that 
                                                          
50 Zhao, Xiaochun, "Weilai zhongmei guanxi he guoji zhixu de kenengxing miaohui - goujian xinxing daguo 
guanxi de sange zhongda lilun wenti (on the Possibilities of the Future Sino-Us Relations and International 
Order -- Three Important Theoretical Problems in Building a New Great Power Relationship)," Xueshu qianyan 
(Frontiers) 6 (2013). 
51 Ibid.:11-12 
52 Dong, Chunling, "Lengzhan fansi yu zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi de goujian (Reflection on Cold War and 
the Construction of Sino-Us New Type of Great Power Relations)," Shijie zhishi (World Affairs) 6 (2014).:54 
53 Chou, Huafei and Zhang, Bangdi, "Quanli zhuanbian he zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi goujian(the Building 
of New Type Sino-Us Major Countries Relations in International Power Transition)," Tongji daxue xuebao 
shehui kexueban (Tongji University Journal Social Science Section) 24, no. 6 (2013).:40 
54 Zhao, "Weilai zhongmei guanxi he guoji zhixu de kenengxing miaohui - goujian xinxing daguo guanxi de 
sange zhongda lilun wenti (on the Possibilities of the Future Sino-Us Relations and International Order -- Three 
Important Theoretical Problems in Building a New Great Power Relationship).":12 
55 Some focus on both traditional major countries and emerging power. For example, Li Zhifei divides new type 
of great power relations into three levels: Sino-US relations; Sino-Russia and Sino-EU relations; and China’s 
relations with developing powers, please see Li, Zhifei, "Fei chuantong anquan zhili yu xinxing daguo guanxi 
goujian (Non-Traditional Security Governance and Construction of New Relations between the Big Powers)," 
Jiaoxue yu yanjiu (Teaching and Research) 6 (2014). 
56 Ni, Shixiong, "Fazhan changqi jiankang de xinxing daguo guanxi (Develop New Type of Great Power 
Relations That Is Long-Term Stable)," Dangdai shijie yu shehui zhuyi (Contemporary World and Socialism) 3 
(2013). 
57 Zhang and Jing, "Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi: lishi, lilun yu xianshi (New Type of Great Power 
Relationship between the Us and China: History, Theory and the Reality).":25 
58 Ibid.:25 
59 Zhang, Xiaoming, "Dui xinxing daguo guanxi de yizhong jiedu (an Interpretation of New Type of Great 
Power Relations)," Guoji zhengzhi yanjiu (International Politics Studies) 1 (2014).:51 
60 Dong, Chunling, "Zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi: dongli hezai? (Sino-Us New Type of Great Power 
Relationship: Where Is the Motivation?)," Shijie zhishi (World Affairs) 9 (2013).:50 
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expanding the number of challenger rising powers is a useful strategic tool, as it might turn 
some of the attention that is typically focused on China towards other powers as well.  
The third group extends the definition of great powers into a wider range of developing 
countries. For example, for Pan Wei, new type of great power relations includes China’s 
relations with a group of developing countries including Bangladesh, Nigeria, Mexico, 
Philippines, and Indonesia.61 However, as we can see in Figure 2, this is a very minor view in 
the literature.  
 
Figure 2：Frequency of countries that are referred as great power in Chinese academic 
discourse of new type of great power relations (1998-2014) 
 
 
Debating world order: bipolar versus multipolar world  
Table 1 briefly summarizes the difference in the Chinese discourse of new type of great 
power relations. We find that 39.71% articles explicitly argue that we are in, or moving 
towards, a multipolar world.  However, this new world order might take considerable time to 
emerge and there is a strong school of thought that suggests the current one single 
superpower and multi-power system is not going to change in the next 5-10 years62  or might 
                                                          
61 Pan, "Zhengzai jueqi de xinxing daguo guanxi (the on-Going Rise of New Type of Great Power 
Relations).":28 
62 Tang, Jing, "Hou weiji shidai de shijie xinxing daguo guanxi ji zhongguo waijiao yingdui zhanlve (New Type 
of Great Power Relations in the Post-Crisis Era and Chinese Foreign Diplomatic Strategy)," Renzi 
sheke(Human Resources & Social Science ) 3 (2014). 
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even be strengthened (in the sort run at least)63. Some argue that the world might become an 
unbalanced multi-polar structure in which American power will lie at the first level, with 
other powers occupying lesser tiers of polar power. Within this fragmented system, China is 
likely to be closer to the first level than any other country.64  
Using a Pearson’s chi-square test, we find that articles that refer only to Sino-US 
relationship are less likely to mention a multipolar world than the second strand of thinking.65  
But here the water gets rather muddied and it is not easy to identify clear schools of thought. 
This seems to be in part at least because there is confusion over the nature of bipolarity, and 
its relationship with a G2-type understanding of the future world. There are some very loud 
proponents of bipolarity. For example, Wu Xinbo argues that it does, and the new type of 
relationship is a “new type of bi-polar relationship” which provides a foundation for “the US 
and China to co-govern the world”.66 He acknowledges, though, that this might not be a very 
palatable idea for much of the rest of the world, and suggest first working together to co-
govern regional affairs, and then gradually move to the global level.67 
But on reflection, the system that he is describing does not sound like bipolarity as it is 
normally understood; a system where two competing power centres oppose each other and 
attract allies and partners into competing camps or blocs. Rather, it sounds like a system 
where, whether they like it or not, China and the US have some sort of special responsibility 
to try and provide global public goods and provide global governance due to their individual 
and collective power statuses. For example, Yuan Peng argues that the US, as the most 
developed country and the representative of Western developed countries, and China, as the 
largest developing country and the representative of emerging powers, can work together to 
represent “the demand of overwhelming majority and reshape the international order”.68 Jiang 
Lingfei argues that when facing challenge of global governance, the US and China as two 
world powers have an unshirkable leadership responsibility.69 Similarly, Da Wei argues that 
“as the two most important power centers in the world, China and the US could together 
become the defender, reformer, and builder of the international system”. 70  
This might be a system where two powers share global predominance, and have the 
most important bilateral relationship in the world that plays a key role in deciding the future 
                                                          
63 Yang, Zhu, "Zhongmei goujian xinxing daguo guanxi de zhanlve sikao (Strategic Conceptions of Structuring 
Innovational Nation Relationship between China and USA)," Beihua daxue xuebao shehui kexue ban (Journal 
of Beihua University Social Science) 14, no. 3 (2013).:103 
64 Xu, "Goujian zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi de lishi tiaojian yu zhuyao wenti (Historical Conditions and 
Major Problems of Establishing Sino-Us New Type of Great Power Relations).":18 
65 Pearson Chi-square Test: X2(1, N = 141) = 13.391, p = .000 
66 Wu, "Goujian zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi de lujing xuanze (Path Selection in Constructing Sino-Us New 
Type of Great Power Relationship).":37 
67 Ibid.:37 
68 Yuan, "Guanyu goujian zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi de zhanlve sikao (Strategic Thoughts on Establishing 
Sino-Us New Type of Great Power Relations).":7 
69 Jiang, Lingfei, "Guanyu zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi de jidian renzhi (Some Thoughts on Sino-Us New 
Type of Great Power Relations)," Dangdai shijie (Contemporary World) 2 (2014).:13 
70 Da, Wei, "Goujian zhongmei xinxing daguo guanxi de lujing xuanze (Approaches to Building a New Type of 
Major Power Relationship between China and the US)," Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi (World Economics and Politics) 
7 (2013).:71 
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of the international system.71 But this is not the same thing as bipolarity. Indeed, in some 
respects, the emphasis on cooperation and shared leadership is the antithesis of bipolarity.  
Finally, there is a group of scholars who do not even see this movement towards shared 
leadership as either possible or desirable (or both). For example, Yu Hongjun argues that the 
US and China simply “do not seek global co-governance” and “bipolarity” and to interpret 
the new type of relationship as a revised G2 is simply “ignorant”.72 For Zhang Zhengwen, the 
only way that China and the US could assume this position of shared leadership is for China 
as No.2 to fall under some form of leadership from the American No.1 and become a willing 
agent of US strategic intentions. Quite simple, “this is impossible for China to accept.”73 
 
Table 1 Brief summary of difference in the Chinese discourse of new type of great 
power relations  
 G2 Non-G2 
Great power US and China US, China, traditional 
Western power emerging 
power 
Conception of global order Potentially bi-polar world/ 
shared or co-governance with 
US 
Multi-polar world 
Understand the rise of China The rise of China is a unique 
phenomenon. 
The rise of emerging power 
including China is a group 
phenomena 
Comparison countries More focus on traditional 
major countries such as 
Japan, German and Russia 
and that China has come to 
the fore of  traditional major 
countries 
More focus on Emerging 
developing countries (e.g. 
BRICS) and that China is one 
of those emerging power 
American hegemony Challenged by one single 
rising power i.e. China 
Challenged by a group of 
emerging power including 
China 
Governance model  The US and China can co-
govern the world 
The world cannot be well-
governed by only two 
countries 
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The heavy focus on the US leaves little room for other countries in this Chinese-coined 
concept. Nonetheless, there is some discussion of relations with the EU, Russia, Japan and 
India. As Figure 2 shows, 15.6% articles refer to Russia as a great power that is second only 
to the US as the world’s other great powers (China excepted – i.e. in third place behind the 
US and China). Sino-Russian relations are perhaps the second most important and the oldest 
new type of great power relations. As we have shown elsewhere, Chinese writers have been 
referring to the search for a new type of great power relationship with Russia since the 
1990s.74 Indeed, it was in relation to Russia that the term was first used – though its current 
iteration seems to have been developed independently rather than explicitly and deliberately 
building on this earlier articulation.  
Many consider the way that China and Russia have built a new relationship (despite 
previous intense hostility and a number of residual points of disagreement) as a “model” for 
how to build a new type of great power relations with others.75 Though once more we find no 
common position and there are also pessimistic views on Sino-Russian relations. Some argue 
that the importance of Sino-Russian relations is overvalued. Sino-Russian relations are not 
sustainable because its current close tie is a necessary consequence of American pressure.76 
Thus, China should “properly and rationally” assess Sino-Russia relations and do not have 
too “high expectations”.77  As one article elaborates, “although the strategic mutual trust 
between China and the Russia has reached a quite high level, we still belong to two ‘families’. 
In many areas, we have very different or even confrontational interests”.78 One of the reasons 
to the development of mutual trust is the existence of shared mutual distrust of the USA. So 
here, Sino-Russian relations are largely a secondary consequence of the primary Sino-US 
relationship. For example, Chen Jian notes that “in the context of US returning to the Asia, 
some argue that China should abandon the non-alignment policy and form an alliance with 
Russia to against the US”.79 Thus, if China reassesses its relationship with the US, it might 
then avoid the strategic tendency of “alliance with Russia to against the US”.80 
Next to Russia, India is the third most mentioned great power in the debate (10.64%), with 
three articles specifically focussing on building Sino-India great power relations. The earliest 
academic discussion on Sino-India new type of great power relations can be found in 2005. It 
is argued that the Sino-US relations are a typical example of China’s relations with developed 
great power, and Sino-India relations are a typical representative of China’s relations with 
developing great powers.81 Some argue that although China does not consider India as a great 
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power, China could use the similar principles of new type of great power relations to deal 
with Sino-India relations.82  
Of all the potential new relationships, the most controversial is with Japan, which is 
referred to as a great power in 9.22% of articles (the fourth most mentioned great power). 
Sino-Japan new type of great power relations is perhaps the most controversial bilateral 
relationship. Given the at times rather fevered discussion about Japan in parts of the Chinese 
media and amongst some online communities, it is notable that there are some rather positive 
analyses. Many argue that China should use new mentality to deal with Japan in order to 
secure its peaceful rise. Here, China could learn from the US, which made decisions based on 
strategic interests instead of historical issues when developing its relationship with Japan 
after WWII.83 But of course, this is not the only view. Some argue that it is too early to talk 
about Sino-Japan new type of great power relationship because Sino-Japan relations are not 
even a normal relationship.84 Some also doubt whether Japan deserves to be a great power as 
the Abe administration does not have any sense of responsibility and justice that a great 
power should have.85 Indeed, during our interview in Beijing, some scholars explicitly told us 
that Japan does not fit into this concept at all, no matter how loosely it is defined.86 
   The last notable great power is the EU. 8.51% articles refer the EU as a great power. The 
new type of great power relationship between China and the EU is no doubt special. It is 
argued that the EU as a supra-national entity is a great power although it does not speak in 
one single voice. Thus, China should not only develop relationship with the EU but also its 
constituent member states. 87  The debate also refers some specific European countries 
including France, the UK, and German as great powers. There is one article that specifically 
focuses on Sino-France relations in this way. But Germany and the UK are only briefly 
mentioned as great powers in broader studies of groups of great powers. Chinese ambassador 
to the UK, Liu Xiaoming, has argued that new type of great power relations should be used in 
the UK-China relations, 88 but Liu’s argument seems to be have found few supporters in the 
academic world in China at least.  
 
Conclusions  
For understandable reasons, the outside world has tended to concentrate on what the rise of 
China means for the international order. But in doing so it often – not always – ignores the 
internal dimension of this change; how this rise is changing conceptions of Chinese views of 
the nature of the rise itself, of China’s new global status and power, and of the character of 
the global order. These internal discourses and debates, we argue, will play an important role 
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in shaping what key Chinese actors think that they can achieve on the global scale, and how 
they can go about doing it.  
When examining the case of new type of great power relations, we find that this Chinese-
coined concept indicates a fundamental shift of China’s evaluation of the power status of 
itself and others. Within China, there is a diverse understanding of China’s identity including 
rising power, world power, No. 2, and superpower. But if we try and identify dominant trends 
we would argue that there is a clear and broad consensus that China really is a Great Power. 
However, we also suggest that while there is an increasing confidence to assert China’s 
global status (in ways that were not evident before the global financial crisis) it is less clear 
how understandings of “power” link with understandings of global leadership, and the 
provision of global public goods. While there does seem to be an acceptance that China’s 
power status gives it some obligation to do things on the global scale (that other “normal” 
states don’t have to do), the moderation of China’s great power status by the widespread 
insistence that it is still emerging and not yet fully risen. In general, it seems that the whole 
point about China being considered to be a great power – perhaps in a G2 with Chinese 
characteristics – is to do things that are good for China. This might have consequences that 
are good for others too, but China’s primary responsibility is still to itself.  
In general (again), there is an acceptance that the US is going to remain the world’s most 
important power for some time to come. And while building new relations with other 
countries remains important, it is the relationship with the US that is the key for China as it 
attempts to find its new place in the global order (and thus, in consequence, for the global 
order itself). Changing the world as No.1 is a hard enough task. Changing the world as No.2 
– particularly when the No.1 doesn’t seem very keen to ease your path to further global 
power – is even harder. Hence the perceived need to both build alliances with sets of 
countries to balance the power of the No.1, and also to try to persuade it to accept your 
legitimate interests and goals as a responsible global great power. 
Collectively, the Chinese literature suggests something of a hierarchy in the type of 
relationships that China is building (or attempting to build) with others, and how far we have 
got to seeing this new relationship building come to fruition. The most successful and 
developed new relationship is with Russia. Relations with India and other emerging powers 
are proceeding well and moving in the right direction. Relations with Europe are also 
developing, and occupy an important role in terms of establishing a differentiated strategy for 
dealing with Western powers (rather than perceiving of and treating the West as a single 
hole). And although some people suggest that the relationship with the US has already 
changed to a new model, most suggest that it is very much a work in progress – and is the key 
for creating a new strategic space for China to operate in.89 Or as more elegantly put by Yang 
Jiemian: 
 “the model of new type of great power relations is Sino-Russia relations, its emphasis 
is Sino-US relations, its growing point is Sino-BRICS relations, its focal point is 
Sino-Europe Relations, and its difficulty is Sino-Japan relations”.90 
While we reassert the importance of studying domestic debates in China as a means of 
trying to understand how China might behave as a Great Power in the future, we finish by 
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pointing to two reasons why studying these discourses on their own is not enough. The first is 
that the world is not just of China’s own making – and neither is China’s place within it. For 
Chinese generated conceptions of world order and great power relations to translate into real 
power politics in the ways envisaged by Chinese thinkers, others will have to be persuaded to 
accept and buy into them. This might prove to be a rather difficult task. The second is that it 
is important for these debates to remain connected to reality. By this we mean that what is 
said and argued within China about the nature of China as a great power will be viewed by 
others alongside the track record of how key Chinese actors utilise Chinese power in 
international politics. In particular, the way that this power is articulated in China’s regional 
relations might make the already difficult task of persuading others to accept Chinese views 
of China as great power even more problematical.  
